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INTRODUCTION

U

nelected judges in democracies are embodiments of countermajoritarianism.1 Unlike democratic legislators and
accountable parliamentarians, judges do not represent constituency interests, nor are they directly accountable to the people.2 Ironically, the countermajoritarianism of unelected judges
* J.S.D. Candidate, Stanford Law School. J.S.M. (Stanford), LL.M. (Harvard),
LL.B. (Mumbai). I am grateful to Professor Helen Stacy for her excellent and
thought-provoking course on international human rights at Stanford. I am
especially grateful to Fernan Restrepo for all his help with and advice on the
quantitative component of my paper. I thank Professor Kate Malleson for
discussing the judicial appointments system in the United Kingdom with me.
I am also grateful to Nicholas Cade, Alexander Csordas, and the editorial
team at the Brooklyn Journal of International Law. Any faults with this Article are my own.
1. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:
THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–23 (1962).
2. The conventional argument is that judiciaries in liberal democracies
are “democratic” for two reasons: (1) they are appointed by elected branches
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is considered to be their greatest virtue in a democracy. Judges
are meant to protect “discrete and insular minorities”3 from the
obdurate will of the majority.4 They constitute pockets of libertarianism within democracy’s Benthamite obsession for the
greatest good of the greatest number.5 International courts
should be no different, and unlike deliberative international
treaty-making organs, international judges do not represent
the viewpoints of their constituencies. Unlike the Security
Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations, for
example, judges appointed to the International Court of Justice
(“ICJ”) do not represent the values or interests of their home
countries. Yet, international instruments require that the composition of international courts and tribunals must fairly reflect the diverse geographic realities of the geopolitical world.6
Deliberative bodies are representative, but courts are not—
why, then, does the international system insist on appointing
judges from different geographic regions to international courts
and tribunals?
Legal realists may find the short answer—legitimacy—to be
unsatisfactory. True, a “rainbow court”7 which fairly reflects
the demographic characteristics of the region in which it is situated might be perceived as being more legitimate, but international courts are seldom honestly diverse. Judges of “P5”
countries disproportionately serve on these courts, and judgeships on international courts are staffed in such a manner that
the region which has the most interest in the court’s outcomes
gets the most representation on the court.8 Since the 1930s,9
of government, from whom they derive their political legitimacy; and (2) political branches of government retain the power to remove judges.
3. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
4. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 73–104 (1980).
5. The reference here is to Jeremy Bentham who advocated the idea of
the greatest happiness of the greatest number. See D.D. RAPHAEL, BRITISH
MORALISTS 1650-1800, at 314–46 (Hackett Publ’g Co. 1991) (1969).
6. See infra notes 43–56 and accompanying text.
7. This is a term which is often used in the context of the South Africa
Constitutional Court. See, e.g., Kate Malleson, Appointments to the House of
Lords: Who Goes Upstairs, in THE JUDICIAL HOUSE OF LORDS 1876–2009, at
112, 115 (Louis Blom-Cooper et al. eds., 2009).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 50–56. The “P5 countries” (the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council) are the United
States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China.
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legal realists have claimed that judges decide cases on the basis of “pre-existing social and political commitments.”10 On international judicial bodies, for example, there is evidence to indicate that the proportion of judges from common law countries
on a panel will affect the likelihood of dissent,11 and that judges
of the European Court of Human Rights who were formerly
government lawyers will be far more deferential towards raison
d’état than private lawyers or academics.12 Scholars have extensively debated whether a statistically significant level of
alignment exists between a judge on an international tribunal
and the judge’s home country.13 Consciously or unconsciously,
then, judges from certain backgrounds might be more (or less)
partial to certain causes. Does the geographic background of an
international judge impact the manner in which he or she decides cases? If so, is the legitimacy of regionally diverse courts
offset by the fear of bias?
In this Article, I seek to quantitatively understand how geographic diversity impacts decision making on the International
Criminal Court (“ICC”). So far, the ICC has dealt exclusively
with cases arising out of the African continent.14 Against this
backdrop, increasing numbers of judges from the African Group
of States have been appointed to the ICC, perhaps on an implicit understanding that their presence on the court is essential to preserve its legitimacy. My research question is: does the
presence of a higher number of judges from the African Group
of States impact the court’s attitude towards African defendants? With an increase in the number of judges from the African Group of States appointed to the ICC, has the court become
9. See Sarah Westergren, Note, Gender Effects in the Courts of Appeals
Revisited: The Data Since 1994, 92 GEO. L.J. 689, 689 (2004).
10. Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSP. ON POL. 261, 263
(2006).
11. See Allison Danner & Erik Voeten, Who Is Running the International
Criminal Justice System?, in WHO GOVERNS THE GLOBE? 35, 37 (Deborah D.
Avant et al. eds., 2010).
12. See Erik Voeten, The Politics of International Judicial Appointments, 9
CHI. J. INT’L L. 387, 390–91 (2009).
13. See, e.g., Il Ro Suh, Voting Behavior of National Judges in International Courts, 63 AM. J. INT’L L. 224, 224–36 (1969); Erik Voeten, The Impartiality of International Judges: Evidence from the European Court of Human
Rights, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417, 417–18 (2008).
14. See, e.g., Is Africa on Trial?, BBC NEWS (Mar. 27, 2012, 4:21 ET),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17513065.
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more (or less) pro-defendant in its approach, at a statistically
significant level, controlling for other factors? If so, can an argument plausibly be made that a disproportionately “diverse”
court undermines its own legitimacy by making it susceptible
to bias?
Part I begins by analyzing formal rules and informal norms
that require national and international courts to be staffed by
“diverse” judges, in order to understand the purposes that diversity serves on courts and to develop a framework for determining when those purposes may be compromised. Much of the
literature acknowledges that diversity lends legitimacy to
courts by making judges “inclusive symbols,” and it typically
refutes claims of bias by arguing that diversity makes courts
“structurally impartial.”15 However, the literature does not account for the fact that diversity on courts, especially international courts, is seldom “fair” or “equitable.” The diversity rules
of the ICC will be situated within the wider context of this discussion. Part II examines formal and informal diversity arrangements for staffing judgeships on the ICC. In Part III, by
coding decisions of the Appeals Chamber of the ICC issued between 2006–2012, and carrying out a logistic regression analysis, this Article presents evidence that suggests that the geographic background of judges, amongst other factors, potentially does make a difference to the manner in which international
judges decide cases. This Article presents quantitative evidence
that suggests that the post-2009 Appeals Chamber of the ICC,
which had a higher number of judges from the African Group of
States serving on it as compared to the pre-2009 Appeals
Chamber, held against African defendants at a statistically
significant level compared to the pre-2009 Appeals Chamber. I
conclude with a discussion of what this could potentially mean
for the legitimacy of international judicial institutions. Data
concerning the judges of the ICC and its decisions have been
obtained from the website of the ICC.16
I. THE DIVERSITY DEBATE
Proponents of diversity argue that it enhances a court’s legitimacy, builds public confidence in the court, remedies past ine15. See infra text accompanying notes 38–42.
16. INT’L
CRIM.
CT.,
http://www.icccpi.int/EN_Menus/icc/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 3, 2013).
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qualities, and improves the quality of decision making on the
court by bringing a diversity of perspectives to its opinions.17 A
court which fairly reflects18 different religious, ethnic, geographic, gender, or racial components of society may signal
that it is “open to all.”19 Scholars have suggested that diversity
on courts may have symbolic or descriptive value on the one
hand, or substantive value on the other.20
At the symbolic or descriptive level, a judge from a “nontraditional”21 background may become an inclusive symbol, or stand
for something he or she physically resembles, despite not necessarily holding the same viewpoints of members of the community for which she stands or appears to represent. For example, Clarence Thomas, an African American justice on the
U.S. Supreme Court, does not share the views held by many
members of the African American community in civil liberties
cases,22 although he stands for or symbolizes members of that
community on the U.S. Supreme Court because he physically
resembles them.
At the substantive level, a “nontraditional” judge is more
than a mere “cosmetic symbol”23 on a court. By their very presence on a bench, judges of “nontraditional” backgrounds may
remove the prejudices that their colleagues may have about
members of their community.24 Such a judge may also bring
“traditionally excluded” perspectives to the cases being decided
by the court. For example, feminist “difference theorists” argue
17. See, e.g., Mark S. Hurwitz, Women and Minorities on State and Federal
Appellate Benches, 1985 and 1999, 85 JUDICATURE 84, 84–85 (2001).
18. See Shimon Shetreet, Judicial Independence: New Conceptual Dimensions and Contemporary Challenges, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE
CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 590, 633–35 (Shimon Shetreet & Jules Deschênes
eds., 1985).
19. See Barbara L. Graham, Toward an Understanding of Judicial Diversity in American Courts, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 153, 156 (2004).
20. Hanna Pitkin used the terms “descriptive” and “symbolic” to describe
representation. See HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF
REPRESENTATION 11 (1967).
21. Sheldon Goldman & Matthew D. Saronson, Clinton’s Nontraditional
Judges: Creating a More Representative Bench, 78 JUDICATURE 68, 69 (1994);
Elliot E. Slotnick, The Paths to the Federal Bench: Gender, Race and Judicial
Recruitment Variation, 67 JUDICATURE 371, 372 (1984).
22. See Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405, 482 (2000).
23. Id. at 480.
24. See Westergren, supra note 9, at 699.
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that women bring different attitudes and values (e.g., caring,
empathy, community) to cases as opposed to men (e.g., abstraction, individualism).25 There is empirical evidence, for example,
to suggest that women judges are harsher on women defendants.26 Minority judges might bring “special sensitivity” or
“unique perspectives” to decision making.27 However, viewed
through this prism, appointing a judge to a court on diversity
considerations may enhance the legitimacy and public appeal
of the court, but it may simultaneously strike a pejorative blow
to the community sought to be represented by the appointment.
After all, how can one unelected person “symbolize” or even
“represent” the views of a community of others? This form of
diversity representation presupposes unanimity of opinions
within the community sought to be represented, and undermines the very system of diversity it attempts to create. An unelected judge from a certain racial, religious, ethnic, geographic, or gender background cannot conceivably represent the diverse values and opinions within the community. For this reason, appointing a minority judge to a court purely on diversity
grounds would undermine the diversity of opinion which prevails within the community to which the judge belongs.
Some critics of diversity on courts argue that it conflicts with
the principle of merit in selecting judges. One scholar calls this
the “merit/diversity paradox”: an apparent conflict between either selecting the best judges to a court, or selecting judges
that best reflect the members of the society in which the court
is situated.28 However, there are at least three reasons why diversity considerations for judicial appointments do not conflict
with the merit principle. First, scholars have suggested that
merit is not necessarily compromised when judges from diverse
backgrounds are selected to courts.29 History provides that justices selected to the U.S. Supreme Court on diversity consider25. See id. at 691.
26. See John Gruhl et al., Women as Policymakers: The Case of Trial Judges, 25 AM. J. POL. SCI. 308, 320 (1981); Westergren, supra note 9, at 698.
27. Goldman & Saronson, supra note 21, at 68.
28. Leny E. De Groot-Van Leeuwen, Merit Selection and Diversity in the
Dutch Judiciary, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER:
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 145, 145 (Kate Malleson &
Peter H. Russell eds., 2006).
29. See, e.g., BARBARA A. PERRY, A “REPRESENTATIVE” SUPREME COURT? THE
IMPACT OF RACE, RELIGION, AND GENDER ON APPOINTMENTS 4 (1991).
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ations always met a minimum standard of merit, and a few of
them even went on to become some of the greatest justices the
Court had ever seen.30 Second, merit cannot be defined in a social or contextual vacuum. Within the Indian context, George
H. Gadbois has suggested that the idea of merit is contextual.31
The diversity of a “nontraditional” judge might well be considered an element of his or her own individual merit. Third, the
very idea of merit may be “self-reflective,”32 “self-select[ing],”33
or “self-cloning.” In other words, the definition of merit varies
with the persons who judge merit—judges of merit, consciously
or unconsciously, may seek a replication of their own credentials in the candidate they seek out. The judge of merit may
seek out a candidate who is least likely to challenge the establishment.34 Some scholars have suggested that it is a “myth”
that merit is a neutral standard.35 The conflict between merit
and diversity has also been categorized as one between traditionalists and behavioralists—the former want judges to objectively and neutrally find the law, the latter recognize that judging is inherently a political process.36
Other critics of diversity argue that it conflicts with democratic theory in that judges, unlike legislators, are not meant to
“represent” constituents.37 In this sense, judges from “nontraditional” backgrounds who bring the perspectives of their community to cases threaten to make themselves less impartial to
their community’s viewpoint.38 Much of the scholarly literature
argues that judges are seldom neutral adjudicators—judging,

30. See id.
31. See generally George H. Gadbois, Jr., Judicial Appointments in India:
The Perils of Non-Contextual Analysis, 7 ASIAN THOUGHT & SOC’Y 124, 124–43
(1982).
32. Kate Malleson, Diversity in the Judiciary: The Case for Positive Action,
36 J.L. & SOC’Y 376, 381 (2009) (quoting Sian Elias, Chief Justice of N.Z., Address to the Australian Women Lawyers’ Conference (June 13, 2008),
http://www.courtsofnz.govt.nz/speechpapers/13-06-08.pdf).
33. Rachel Davis & George Williams, Reform of the Judicial Appointments
Process: Gender and the Bench of the High Court of Australia, 27 MELB. U. L.
REV. 819, 835 (2003).
34. See Lady Hale, Making a Difference? Why We Need a More Diverse Judiciary, 56 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 281, 282 (2005).
35. See, e.g., Davis & Williams, supra note 33, at 830–33.
36. See PERRY, supra note 29, at 138.
37. See, e.g., Hale, supra note 34, at 287.
38. See id.
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in constitutional cases, is a political process—and personal value choices often color decisions.39 For this reason, it is argued
that “nontraditional” or “traditionally excluded” judges on a
panel may ensure that no single set of people or values dominates a court’s opinions.40 In this sense, diversity is said to enhance the “structural impartiality” of the court.41 There is also
the criticism that allowing judicial appointments to be made on
considerations other than merit, like diversity, will inappropriately afford a backdoor entry for political influence to enter the
system of judicial appointments.42 However, this argument
once again assumes that diversity candidates appointed to
courts are non-meritorious. Ensuring that such candidates
meet a certain threshold level of merit may serve to exclude
political influence.
A. Geographic Diversity
There is a particularly large volume of literature on geographic diversity in international bodies.43 Article 23 of the
U.N. Charter calls on the General Assembly to elect nonpermanent members to the Security Council, keeping in mind
the principle of “equitable geographical distribution.”44 This
principle seems to have percolated into international judicial
bodies as well, even though judges nominated by states are not
state representatives and do not represent national interests.
International judicial bodies have formal mechanisms for ensuring geographic diversity. Although judges on the ICJ are
required to be appointed regardless of their nationality,45 the
statute of the ICJ formally provides that no two judges on the
court can belong to the same nationality.46 Similarly, formal
39. See, e.g., Ifill, supra note 22, at 411–12.
40. See id.
41. Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity, Impartiality
and Representation on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REV. 95, 106 (1997).
42. See Malleson, supra note 32, at 378.
43. See, e.g., Amber Fitzgerald, Security Council Reform: Creating a More
Representative Body of the Entire U.N. Membership, 12 PACE INT’L L. REV. 319
(2000); Michael J. Kelly, U.N. Security Council Permanent Membership: A
New Proposal for a Twenty-First Century Council, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 319
(2000).
44. U.N. Charter art. 23, para. 1.
45. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 2, June 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.
46. See id. art. 3, para. 1.
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provisions exist on the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”)47 and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”).48 However, informal norms determine geographic representation on these bodies, and state
representation on these bodies is not always equal. Accordingly, “a judge from each P-5 member, except for China, has sat . .
. on the ICJ since the Court’s inception,”49 and the remaining
ten seats on the court are distributed regionally, such that Africa gets three seats (one seat each for North Africa, francophone Sub-Saharan Africa, and anglophone Sub-Saharan Africa), Western Europe/Other, Latin America/Caribbean, and Asia
each hold two seats, and one seat goes to Eastern Europe.50
This arrangement matches the distribution of non-permanent
seats on the Security Council.51 Judges of P5 countries have
also consistently held seats on either the ICTY or the ICTR.52
However, judgeships on the ICTY are dominated by Western
judges, while judgeships on the ICTR are dominated by African
judges,53 indicating that geographic representation on these
bodies is organized in such a manner that the region that has
the most interest in the tribunal’s outcomes, or in the stability
of the area with which the tribunal deals, gets the most representation on the tribunal.54 It seems apparent that “equitable”
geographic distribution on these bodies does not mean “equal”
representation, and, in this sense, state representation on international judicial bodies does not comport with the principle
of the sovereign equality of states, especially on account of the
dominance of powerful states on these bodies. On the other
hand, an informal norm dictates that each member state of the
European Court of Justice gets to appoint a judge to the
47. See Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, art. 12,
para. 1, May 25, 1993, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827.
48. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 11,
para. 1, Nov. 8, 1994, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955.
49. Jacob Katz Cogan, Representation and Power in International Organization: The Operational Constitution and Its Critics, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 209,
229 (2009).
50. See id. at 231.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 229–30.
53. See Danner & Voeten, supra note 11, at 49.
54. See id. at 50.
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court.55 Geographic representation is perceived as being necessary for the legitimacy of these international judicial bodies.56
Geographic representation was an important consideration in
staffing appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court up until the
late nineteenth century. The convention of seeking to achieve a
geographically balanced court began with President George
Washington himself, who emphasized “geographic suitability”
on the court because he wanted to be “president of all the
states of the fledgling nation,” and who consequently rewarded
a strategic state with a Supreme Court appointment on occasion.57 Barbara Perry notes that the convention of balancing
the U.S. Supreme Court’s membership by state or region was
meant to make the court an “inclusive symbol.”58 This convention was said to be especially relevant in the early history of
the United States,59 a time period when U.S. Supreme Court
justices “rode circuit,”60 knowledge of local laws was necessary,61 and when “regional disputes were the foremost conflict
of the era.”62 There was an informal practice that New England, Virginia, Pennsylvania, and New York would get seats on
the U.S. Supreme Court.63 The 1999 edition of Henry J. Abra-

55. See Cogan, supra note 50, at 233.
56. See Medard R. Rwelamira, Composition and Administration of the
Court, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME
STATUTE 153, 165–66 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999); William J. Aceves, Critical Jurisprudence and International Legal Scholarship: A Study of Equitable Distribution, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 299, 384–85 (2001).
57. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF
APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 78–79 (3d ed. 1992).
58. PERRY, supra note 29, at 4.
59. See F.L. Morton, Judicial Appointments in Post-Charter Canada: A
System in Transition, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER:
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 56, 58 (Kate Malleson &
Peter H. Russell eds., 2006); Barbara A. Perry, The Life and Death of the
“Catholic Seat” on the United States Supreme Court, 6 J.L. & POL. 55, 56
(1989).
60. “Riding circuit” involved going to different states and serving as a circuit court judge. See David R. Stras, Why Supreme Court Justices Should
Ride Circuit Again, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1710, 1711 (2007).
61. See PERRY, supra note 29, at 5; Paul A. Freund, The New England Seat
on the Supreme Court, 87 PROC. MASS. HIST. SOC’Y 32, 32 (1975).
62. Jeffrey Toobin, Diverse Opinions, NEW YORKER, June 8, 2009, at 37.
63. See id.; John W. Whitehead & John M. Beckett, A Dysfunctional Supreme Court: Remedies and a Comparative Analysis, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV.
171, 195 (2009).

2013]

DIVERSITY & THE INT'L CRIMINAL COURT

497

ham’s classical work on U.S. Supreme Court justices reveals
that the states of New York, Virginia, Ohio, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, and Tennessee, in that order, had the highest
number of justices appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court, and
that justices had been appointed to the Court from thirty-one of
the nation’s fifty states.64
By the late nineteenth century, the notion of “geographic
suitability” faded. Perry attributes three reasons to the demise
of the convention of geographic balance in staffing appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court. First, the Circuit Court of
Appeals Act of 1891 ended the practice of circuit-riding, and
with it the practical necessity of having Supreme Court justices
with knowledge of local laws.65 Second, with the end of the Civil War, the “old order” came to an end, and the forces of regionalism diminished in strength.66 Finally, other “representative”
factors, such as religion, race, ethnicity, and gender, lessened
the importance of geography as a measure of diversity.67 However, geography was still given some weight until the midtwentieth century,68 with Richard Nixon being the last president to seriously take into account geographic considerations.69
When it existed, the norm of geographic diversity granted legitimacy to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions—one scholar argues that the fact that the Court’s desegregation decision in
Brown v. Board of Education was issued by a court that included one justice each from Alabama (Justice Hugo Black), Kentucky (Justice Forman Reed), and Texas (Justice Tom Clark)
bolstered the legitimacy of the decision.70 Today, geographic
representation is said to be irrelevant for judicial appointments

64. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF
U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 46
(1999). See also ABRAHAM, supra note 57, at 62.
65. See PERRY, supra note 29, at 7; John Benjamin Ashby, Supreme Court
Appointments Since 1937, at 15–16 (Jan. 1972) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Notre Dame).
66. See PERRY, supra note 29, at 7.
67. See id.
68. See ABRAHAM, supra note 57, at 254 (stating that even President
Dwight D. Eisenhower—in office from 1953 to 1961—considered “geographic
balance” on the Supreme Court to be important).
69. See Joel K. Goldstein, Choosing Justices: How Presidents Decide, 26
J.L. & POL. 425, 457 (2011).
70. See Freund, supra note 61, at 44.
THE
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to the U.S. Supreme Court.71 For example, few commentators
noted the fact that Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and William
Rehnquist served on the same court despite both being from
the state of Arizona.72
Judges are appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada by an
informal norm of geographic representation, although formal
law only requires that three judges be appointed to the court
from the province of Quebec.73 Informally, three judges are appointed to the court from Ontario, one from Atlantic Canada,74
and two from the western provinces75—typically one from British Columbia and one from the three Prairie76 provinces.77 Ontario’s presence on the court declined to two judges in 1979,
with the appointment of William McIntyre (British Columbia)
to replace Wishart Spence, although this was rectified in 1982
with the appointment of Bertha Wilson (Ontario) following
Ronald Martland’s retirement.78 There is some debate as to
whether at least one of the non-Quebec judges should be francophone, and whether one of the Quebec judges should be anglophone.79 By convention, since the 1930s the post of Chief
Justice has also typically alternated between a judge from

71. See Toobin, supra note 62.
72. See id.
73. See IAN GREENE ET AL., FINAL APPEAL: DECISION-MAKING IN CANADIAN
COURTS OF APPEAL 101–02 (1998); Richard Devlin et al., Reducing the Democratic Deficit: Representation, Diversity and the Canadian Judiciary, or Towards a “Triple P” Judiciary, 38 ALTA. L. REV. 734, 763 (2000); James C.
Hopkins & Albert C. Peeling, Aboriginal Judicial Appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada 12 (Apr. 6, 2004) (unpublished paper prepared for the
Indigenous
Bar
Association),
available
at
http://www.indigenousbar.ca/pdf/Aboriginal%20Appointment%20to%20the%2
0Supreme%20Court%20Final.pdf.
74. The “Atlantic Provinces” are New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland and Labrador. See Maritime Provinces,
ONLINE
ENCYCLOPÆDIA
(Jan.
5,
2013),
BRITANNICA
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/365528/Maritime-Provinces.
75. Devlin et al., supra note 73, at 763.
76. The “Prairie Provinces” are Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. See
(Jan.
5,
Prairie
Provinces,
BRITANNICA ONLINE ENCYCLOPÆDIA
2013), http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/473851/Prairie-Provinces.
77. See Peter McCormick, Selecting the Supremes: The Appointment of
Judges to the Supreme Court of Canada, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1, 13
(2005).
78. See id. at 13 n.32.
79. See id. at 22.
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Quebec and a judge from the rest of Canada.80 This form of regional representation on the Canadian Supreme Court is
meant to reassure provinces that their special circumstances
will receive a “fair hearing.”81 Peter McCormick says that
though regional representation on the Canadian Supreme
Court is a “very strong convention,”82 it “complicate[s] the professionalism of a merit-based system”—after all, “what if the
objectively best judges at the occasion of any vacancy, over and
over again, are sitting on the Ontario Court of Appeal, easily
and always the country’s strongest provincial court of appeal?”83
A similar convention of geographic representation exists in
Europe. In the United Kingdom there is a tradition of ensuring
“an appropriate ethnic balance” on the House of Lords by conferring representation to all three of the nation’s constituent
parts84—two judges typically hail from Scotland85 and one from
Northern Ireland86—although the convention of having one
judge from Northern Ireland serving on the court is not as
firmly followed.87 There is also a debate in the United Kingdom
as to whether one judge should be appointed from Wales.88
There is some indication that judgeships on the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany are “distributed proportionately
on the basis of geographical origin and party affiliation”89—that
seats are evenly distributed on the court between the four regions of Germany: Bavaria, the Rhineland, the Northeast, and

80. List of Justices of the Supreme Court of Canada, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Justices_of_the_Supreme_Court_of_Cana
da (last visited Jan. 6, 2013).
81. Morton, supra note 59, at 58.
82. McCormick, supra note 77, at 13.
83. Id. at 22.
84. Hale, supra note 34, at 291.
85. See Malleson, supra note 7, at 114.
86. See Shetreet, supra note 18, at 634.
87. See Graham Gee, Devolution and the Courts, in DEVOLUTION, LAW
MAKING AND THE CONSTITUTION 252, 283 (Robert Hazell & Richard Rawlings
eds., 2005).
88. E-mail correspondence with a noted scholar of judiciaries in the United
Kingdom (on file with author).
89. Donald P. Kommers, Autonomy Versus Accountability: The German
Judiciary, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 131, 147 (Peter H. Russell & David
M. O’Brien eds., 2001).
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Southwestern Germany.90 The 1814 constitution of the Netherlands provided that judges of the Supreme Court should be
picked from “all provinces and landscapes,”91 although this was
“last referred to” in 1902.92 Geographic considerations are irrelevant on the High Court of Australia, where appointments are
driven by considerations of merit,93 but where, consequently,
some states see greater representation than others.94
In India, an attempt is made to ensure that judges of the Supreme Court represent the different geographic regions.95 Further, seats on the Supreme Court of India are sought to be distributed between states. Not more than two (or in rare cases,
three) judges belonging to the same High Court serve on the
Supreme Court of India at the same time.96 Judges are considered to belong to the region or state where they were first appointed as a High Court judge,97 irrespective of where they

90. See DONALD P. KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN WEST GERMANY: A
STUDY OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 147 (1976).
91. De Groot-Van Leeuwen, supra note 28, at 148.
92. Id.
93. See George Williams, High Court Appointments: The Need for Reform,
30 SYDNEY L. REV. 161, 162–63 (2008).
94. See John M. Williams, Judicial Independence in Australia, in JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM
AROUND THE WORLD 173, 177 (Peter H. Russell & David M. O’Brien eds.,
2001). However, one scholar claims that the requirement that the attorneygeneral consult state attorneys-general before making recommendations for
judicial appointments briefly increased state representation. See Elizabeth
Handsley, “The Judicial Whisper Goes Around”: Appointment of Judicial Officers in Australia, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER:
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 122, 124 (Kate Malleson &
Peter H. Russell eds., 2006).
95. See Abhinav Chandrachud, An Empirical Study of the Supreme Court’s
Composition, ECON. & POL. WKLY., Jan. 1, 2011, at 71.
96. India has a unitary judicial structure; there are no separate state and
federal courts. High Courts in India are appellate courts, roughly equivalent
to circuit courts in the U.S. High Court decisions can be appealed before the
Supreme Court of India, which occupies the highest rung in the appellate
hierarchy. See generally Abhinav Chandrachud, Speech, Structure, and Behavior on the Supreme Court of India, 25 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 222, 231–33
(2012).
97. If a person is first appointed to the post of additional judge on a High
Court, and is later appointed a permanent judge while serving on another
High Court, he or she is typically still considered as belonging to the state or
region in which he or she was initially appointed as an additional judge on a
High Court. See Chandrachud, infra note 99.
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were born, where they lived for most of their life, or what their
mother tongue is. The most striking illustration of this occurred during Chief Justice K.G. Balakrishnan’s term between
2007-2010, during which the retirement of a judge each from
the states of Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Punjab
and Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, and Assam (including
Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur, Tripura, Mizoram, and Arunachal Pradesh), and from the National Capital Territory of
Delhi, was compensated by appointing to the Supreme Court of
India one judge from each of those respective states or territories.98 “The court has grown more geographically inclusive with
every passing decade.”99
B. Religion, Race, and Gender
On national courts, religion, race, and gender have typically
supplanted geographic diversity as criteria for staffing judgeships. Religion was an informal factor considered while making
appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court starting with the late
nineteenth century, although its role substantially, if not entirely, diminished by the late twentieth century.100 The U.S.
Constitution prohibits religious tests for public office, and the
practice of appointing justices to the Court for the religion they
represent could therefore only be an informal one.101 Presidents
who appointed justices belonging to religious minority communities often did so to reward their core constituency or to at98. See Chandrachud, supra note 95.
99. Abhinav Chandrachud, The Informal Constitution: Unwritten Criteria
in Selecting Judges for the Supreme Court of India (May 2012) (unpublished
SPILS master’s thesis, Stanford Law School) (on file with Stanford Law
School).
100. See ABRAHAM, supra note 57, at 63–64; THOMAS KARFUNKEL & THOMAS
W. RYLEY, THE JEWISH SEAT: ANTI-SEMITISM AND THE APPOINTMENT OF JEWS TO
THE SUPREME COURT 144–46 (1978); PERRY, supra note 29, at 46–47, 79–81;
Sheldon Goldman, Why We Have a Catholic-Majority Court: The Politics of
Appointing Catholics to the Federal Courts, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 193, 202
(2006); Paul Horwitz, Religious Tests in the Mirror: The Constitutional Law
and Constitutional Etiquette of Religion in Judicial Nominations, 15 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 75, 127 (2006); Perry, supra note 59, at 56; Philippa Strum,
(Untitled), 79 J. AM. HIST. 1207, 1207–08 (1992) (reviewing BARBARA A.
PERRY, A “REPRESENTATIVE” SUPREME COURT? THE IMPACT OF RACE, RELIGION,
AND GENDER ON APPOINTMENTS (1991)); Ashby, supra note 65, at 16–17.
101. See Goldman, supra note 100, at 195. But see Horwitz, supra note 100,
at 127.
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tract members of that constituency as voters.102 Members of the
religious community may have viewed a Supreme Court appointment as confirmation of their “integration into American
public life.”103 In 1836, Justice Roger Taney was the first Roman Catholic appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court—he was
later appointed Chief Justice by Andrew Jackson— but religion
had little to do with his appointment, and no Catholic served
on the court for thirty years after his death.104 The “Catholic
seat” on the U.S. Supreme Court is said to have begun with the
appointment of Justice Edward White in 1894, who was subsequently appointed Chief Justice in 1910 by William H. Taft in
order to attract the Catholic vote, according to some.105 Religion
played a definite role in the appointment of Justice Joseph
McKenna to the Court by William McKinley in 1898, consequent to which two Catholic justices served simultaneously on
the Court for the first time in its history.106 The appointments
of Justice Pierce Butler by Warren Harding in 1922 and Justice
Frank Murphy by Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1940 were similarly
colored by considerations of religion.107 When Justice Murphy
died in 1949, Harry Truman did not replace him with another
Catholic justice, but Dwight Eisenhower restored the “Catholic
seat” by appointing Justice William Brennan to the Court in
1956.108 Religion had a marginal role, if any, in the appointments of subsequent Catholic justices to the court,109 as other
diversity factors, such as race and gender, took precedence.
The “Jewish seat” was established on the U.S. Supreme
Court with the appointment of Justice Louis Brandeis to the
Court by Woodrow Wilson in 1916.110 Justice Benjamin
Cardozo was later appointed to the Court in 1932 by Herbert
102. See KARFUNKEL & RYLEY, supra note 100, at 144; Goldman, supra note
100, at 208.
103. KARFUNKEL & RYLEY, supra note 100, at 144.
104. See PERRY, supra note 29, at 20–23.
105. See id. at 23–26, 29–31 (citations omitted).
106. See id. at 26–29.
107. See id. at 31–39.
108. See id. at 39–42.
109. These were the appointments of Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy
by President Ronald Reagan in 1986 and 1988 respectively, of Clarence
Thomas by President George H. W. Bush in 1991, of John Roberts and Samuel Alito by President George W. Bush in 2005 and 2006 respectively, and of
Sonia Sotomayor by President Barack Obama in 2009.
110. See KARFUNKEL & RYLEY, supra note 100, at 144.
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Hoover, followed by Justice Felix Frankfurter (Roosevelt, in
1939), Justice Arthur Goldberg (John F. Kennedy, in 1962),
and Justice Abe Fortas (Lyndon Johnson, in 1965).111 With the
resignation of Justice Fortas from the Court in 1969, Nixon
chose not to continue the tradition of the “Jewish seat” on the
court, appointing a Methodist (Justice Harry Blackmun) instead.112 Scholars have suggested that the “Jewish seat” ended
on the court because Republican presidents did not find it advantageous, as the Jewish vote was typically Democratic,113
and Jewish leaders did not significantly pursue the issue.114
Perry suggests that it came to an end because Jews had better
assimilated into American society by that time, and gender began to take precedence on the Court.115 Others have suggested
that the “Jewish seat” had outlived its usefulness, since the
Jewish community had “shed its considerable insecurity,” and
the community was not “overly disturbed” when the seat was
eliminated.116
Religion has generally been less relevant for appointments to
the Court in the late-twentieth century.117 For example, the
fact that Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Anthony Kennedy
were Catholic was entirely coincidental to their appointments.118 As one commentator notes, “[r]eligious tensions have
also cooled,”119 which is why religious “seats” on the Court have
disappeared. Today, the Court has six Roman Catholic justices
(Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Sonia Sotomayor) and three Jewish
justices (Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Elena
Kagan).120 With Justice Kagan’s appointment to the Court in
111. See PERRY, supra note 29, at 67–79.
112. See id. at 79.
113. See Strum, supra note 100, at 1207.
114. See id.
115. See PERRY, supra note 29, at 80.
116. KARFUNKEL & RYLEY, supra note 100, at 146.
117. See Goldman, supra note 100, at 193.
118. See Perry, supra note 59, at 56, 88.
119. Toobin, supra note 62.
120. See Cathy Lynn Grossman, Does the U.S. Supreme Court Need Another
TODAY
(Apr.
9,
2010,
2:55
PM),
Protestant?,
USA
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/Religion/post/2010/04/supremecourt-justice-stevens-catholic-jewish/1; Obama Chooses Elena Kagan for SuPOLITICS
(May
12,
2010,
10:31
AM),
preme
Court,
CNN
http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/05/10/scotus.kagan/index.html.

504

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 38:2

2010, for the first time since its establishment in 1789, the U.S.
Supreme Court does not have a Protestant justice.121 However,
one scholar has argued that religion was still a “plus” or “minus” factor for recent appointments made or sought to be made
to the U.S. Supreme Court, as was the case with Chief Justice
Roberts, who was questioned as to whether his religious beliefs
would conflict with his ability to decide abortion cases.122 To
some extent, those questions suggest that religion has ceased
to become a form of descriptive or symbolic representation on
the Court, but rather is now substantive or active representation—religion on the Court is no longer a symbol of inclusiveness, but its presence signals a fear that it may cloud legal interpretation.
Religious “seats” on supreme courts are not limited to the
United States alone. In the Netherlands, until 1968, a practice
existed that a vacancy on the Supreme Court arising out of the
retirement or death of a Catholic judge would be followed by
the appointment of a Catholic judge to the court.123 By 1913,
the court had four Catholic judges.124 Seats were also reserved
on the court for Protestants, and a Jewish judge was appointed
occasionally.125 Although this custom is no longer followed on
the Supreme Court, it is still “widely practiced” on other courts
in the Netherlands.126 On the Supreme Court of Israel, a seat
has typically been reserved for an Orthodox Jew, and since
1962, a seat has unofficially been reserved for a Sephardic
judge.127 There have been calls to appoint judges from different

121. Cf. Adam Liptak, Stevens, the Only Protestant on the Supreme Court,
TIMES
(Apr.
10,
2010),
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/11/weekinreview/11liptak.html?_r=0 (“[Justice John Paul Stevens’] retirement . . . makes possible something that would
have been unimaginable a generation or two ago—a court without a single
member of the nation’s majority religion.”).
122. See Horwitz, supra note 100, at 127–28 (citations omitted).
123. See De Groot-Van Leeuwen, supra note 28, at 148; Peter J. Van Koppen, The Dutch Supreme Court and Parliament: Political Decisionmaking
Versus Nonpolitical Appointments, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 745, 770 (1990).
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See Eli M. Salzberger, Judicial Appointments and Promotions in Israel: Constitution, Law, and Politics, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF
JUDICIAL POWER: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 241, 250
(Kate Malleson & Peter H. Russell eds., 2006).
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religious and ethnic backgrounds to the Supreme Court of Israel in order to make the court more “reflective”—as opposed to
“representative”—of different groups within society.128 In Germany, one scholar has suggested that a religious equilibrium
(i.e., a balance between the Catholic and Protestant members
of the court) be maintained on the Federal Constitutional
Court, and there is some suggestion of implementing an informal norm that judges of Jewish ancestry be appointed to the
court.129 Informal barriers existed in the United Kingdom
against the appointment of Catholic and Jewish justices to
higher courts, although in more recent times, the proportion of
Jewish justices serving on higher courts is believed to be greater than the number of Jews in the general population.130
In the United States, gender and race have replaced geography and religion as informal diversity criteria in making judicial appointments—as one commentator puts it, “the rules of
diversity have changed.”131 There is a large volume of scholarly
literature on the question of whether any particular system of
appointing judges to state courts makes it more or less likely
that racial minorities and women will be appointed.132 When
Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court’s first African American
justice, was appointed by Johnson to the U.S. Supreme Court
in 1967, the primary consideration was race.133 Similarly, gender was the primary consideration when Justice O’Connor was
appointed the first female justice on the Court by Ronald
Reagan in 1981.134 Jimmy Carter is widely considered to be the
first president to appoint women and racial minorities to the
lower federal courts in large numbers.135 However, ethnic and
128. See id.
129. See KOMMERS, supra note 90, at 121, 147–48.
130. E-mail correspondence with a noted scholar of judiciaries in the United
Kingdom (on file with author).
131. Toobin, supra note 62.
132. See, e.g., Adam Goldstein, Note, Judicial Selection As It Relates to
Gender Equality on the Bench, 13 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 369, 386–90
(2007); Graham, supra note 19, at 153; Mark S. Hurwitz, Selection System,
Diversity and the Michigan Supreme Court, 56 WAYNE L. REV. 691, 700
(2010); Malia Reddick, Merit Selection: A Review of the Social Scientific Literature, 106 DICK. L. REV. 729, 731–32, 744 (2002).
133. See PERRY, supra note 29, at 99–102.
134. See ABRAHAM, supra note 57, at 338–40.
135. See Goldman & Saronson, supra note 21, at 68; PERRY, supra note 29,
at 120.
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racial minorities are still considered underrepresented on federal and state courts,136 although great progress has been made
in recent decades.137 Today, the U.S. Supreme Court has three
female justices (Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan), one
of whom also happens to be of Hispanic background (Justice
Sotomayor), and one African American justice (Justice Thomas).
Again, this form of diversity is not limited to the United
States alone. In the United Kingdom, there has been “official
support” for increasing diversity in the judiciary since the
1990s.138 In order to thwart some of the problems associated
with “tap on the shoulder” type appointments—where candidates are approached and invited to become judges—judicial
positions are now advertised and “nontraditional” candidates
are encouraged to apply. The Judicial Appointments Commission under the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005, established
in 2006, has a statutory duty to “have regard to the need to encourage diversity in the range of persons available for selection
for appointments.”139 The British judiciary, however, is still
criticized for being largely elite, male, white, old, upper class,
and out of touch.140 Baroness Hale of Richmond was the first
female Law Lord appointed to the House of Lords, and as of
this writing, she is the only female judge on the Supreme Court
of the United Kingdom.141 In her own words, she was not the
first woman lawyer good enough to sit with the other male
judges, only the first one who was “visible to them.”142 The Australian judicial system has been criticized for its absence of diversity—judges are typically male and of Anglo-Saxon or Celtic
background.143 More recently, however, female justices have
136. See Graham, supra note 19, at 153.
137. See Hurwitz, supra note 17, at 84.
138. Malleson, supra note 32, at 376. See also Kate Malleson, The New Judicial Appointments Commission in England and Wales: New Wine in New
Bottles?, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER: CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 39, 43 (Kate Malleson & Peter H.
Russell eds., 2006) (citations omitted).
139. Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4, § 64(1) (U.K.).
140. See Malleson, supra note 138, at 42.
COURT,
141. Cf.
Biographies
of
the
Justices,
SUPREME
http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/about/biographies-of-the-justices.html (last
visited Jan. 6, 2013).
142. Hale, supra note 34, at 291.
143. Davis & Williams, supra note 33, at 827 (citations omitted).
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increasingly been appointed to the High Court of Australia.
The first female justice to be appointed to that court was Mary
Gaudron in 1987—the first female amongst forty-four justices
appointed to the High Court in the last century.144 However,
the court now has three female justices (Susan Crennan, Susan
Kiefel, and Virginia Bell, appointed in 2005, 2007, and 2009,
respectively). The constitution of South Africa contains an explicit requirement that the need to “reflect broadly the racial
and gender composition of South Africa must be considered
when judicial officers are appointed.”145 Women and black
judges have increasingly been appointed to the courts.146 However, gender diversity in South Africa is considered subordinate
to racial diversity.147 Consequently, as Chief Justice Arthur
Chaskalson noted in his retirement speech in 2005, although
50 percent of the judiciary was black, only 15 percent consisted
of women.148 Two original members of the Constitutional Court
of South Africa were women (Kate O’Regan and Yvonne Mokgoro) and the court presently has two women serving on it
(Bess Nkabinde-Mmono and Sisi Khampepe).149 Canada has
made some of the strongest efforts at attaining gender diversity.150 Bertha Wilson, in 1982, became the first female justice
appointed to the court.151 When this was written, the Canadian
144. See id.
145. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 8, §174(2). See also FIJI CONST., Sept. 23,
1988, § 134 (mandating that the “composition of the judiciary should, as far
as practicable, reflect the ethnic and gender balance of the community.”).
146. See Hugh Corder, Seeking Social Justice? Judicial Independence and
Responsiveness in a Changing South Africa, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN
THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD
194, 198 (Peter H. Russell & David M. O’Brien eds., 2001).
147. See Ruth B. Cowan, Women’s Representation on the Courts in the Republic of South Africa, 6 MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 291, 309–
11 (2006).
148. Id. at 303 (citations omitted).
CT.
S.
AFR.,
149. Cf.
Former
Judges,
CONST.
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/judges/formerjudges.htm (last visited
Jan.
6,
2013);
Current
Judges,
CONST. CT. S. AFR.,
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/judges/currentjudges.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2013).
150. See Hale, supra note 34, at 285; Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, Outsiders on
the Bench: The Continuing Struggle for Equality, 16 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 15, 20
(2001).
151. See Bertha Wilson, BRITANNICA ONLINE ENCYCLOPÆDIA (Jan. 6, 2013),
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1339736/Bertha-Wilson.
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court had four female justices serving—its Chief Justice (Beverley McLachlin) and Justices Marie Deschamps, Rosalie Silberman Abella, Andromache Karakatsanis—only one short of a
female majority.152
II. DIVERSITY AND THE ICC
Eligibility for appointment to one of the eighteen positions on
the ICC requires a candidate to satisfy four criteria: character,
experience, fluency, and diversity.153 First, judges have to possess “high moral character, impartiality and integrity,” and
ought to be qualified in their own states for appointment to the
highest judicial office.154 Second, they ought to possess established competence in one of two areas: criminal law and procedure or international law.155 Third, judges must be fluent in
one of the working languages of the court.156 Fourth, judges
must come from diverse geographic (and demographic) backgrounds—no two judges can be nationals of the same state157—
and in appointing judges to the court, States Parties (i.e., the
countries that are parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC)158
must take account of the need for: (1) representation of the
principal legal systems of the world, (2) equitable geographic
representation, and (3) fair representation of female and male
judges.159 The Rome Statute, which establishes the ICC and
sets out its powers, is perhaps the “first major international

152. Cf. Judges of the Court, SUP. CT. CAN., http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/courtcour/ju/cfpju-jupp/index-eng.asp (last visited Jan. 6, 2013). Justice Deschamps retired on August 7, 2012. See About the Court: Judges of the Court,
COURT
OF
CANADA,
http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/courtSUPREME
cour/ju/deschamps/index-eng.asp (last visited Feb. 1, 2013).
153. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 36, July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
154. Id. art. 36(3)(a).
155. Id. art. 36(3)(b). Specific experience dealing with violence against
women and children is also preferable. Id. art. 36(8)(b).
156. Id. art. 36(3)(c).
157. Id. art. 36(7).
158. See ICC—The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIM. CT.,
http://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to
%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx (last visited Jan. 6, 2013), for a list of
States Parties to the Rome Statute.
159. Rome Statute, supra note 153, art. 36(8)(a).
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agreement” to emphasize gender representation.160 Accordingly, the formal provisions of the Rome Statute call for three
types of diversity in appointing judges to the ICC: geographic
diversity, gender diversity, and a diversity of professional experiences.
However, although judicial appointments to the ICC have to
be made on considerations of diversity, between 2003 and 2011,
the diversity rule of the court did not guarantee equal representation to different groups. Thus, for example, judges with
experience in criminal law and procedure have typically outnumbered those with experience in international law.161 Since
the court deals with criminal law cases, experience in criminal
law is perhaps naturally considered more valuable than generalist experience in the field of international law. Since 2009,
the female judges on the court have outnumbered the male
judges—the ICC is perhaps one of the few prominent courts in
the world to have accomplished this. Typically, though not universally, at least half of the judges appointed to the ICC have
significant prior judicial experience working either on a high
court in their home countries or on an international tribunal or
court.
Like the other international tribunals, geographic diversity
on the ICC is measured in terms of regional subgroups. Five
regional subgroups are sought to be informally represented on
the court: Western European and Others Group of States
(“WEOG”), Latin American and Caribbean Group of States
(“GRULAC”), Asian Group of States (“Asian States”), African
Group of States (“African States”), and the Group of Eastern
European States (“Eastern Europe”). Although there is no formal law that requires this, and although cases which the ICC
have dealt with predominantly concern Africa so far, since its
inception the largest number of judges on the ICC have always
come from the WEOG states. Further, both the P5 countries
that are States Parties to the Rome Statute (the United King160. Aceves, supra note 56, at 384–85.
161. In other words, the “List A” judges have typically always outnumbered
the “List B” judges. However, consequent to the 2007 elections, the total
number of List A and List B judges on the court was the same, until the election in 2009. Under article 36(5) of the Rome Statute, there are supposed to
be two lists of candidates for election to the court—broadly speaking, List A
consists of candidates who have criminal law expertise, while List B consists
of candidates with international law expertise.
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dom and France) have always had one of their judges serve on
the court. Thus, for example, when Claude Jorda (France) resigned from the court in 2009, Bruno Cotte (France) was appointed to the court to compensate for the French vacancy.
Similarly, when Sir Adrian Fulford’s (United Kingdom) term on
the court came to an end in 2012, Howard Morrison (United
Kingdom) was appointed to the court to compensate for the
British vacancy on the court. Chart 1 below reveals that the
number of judges from the African States has gradually increased on the ICC, perhaps when it increasingly began to be
realized that the court’s docket dealt primarily with cases of
that region. Having a large contingent of judges from the African States is therefore perhaps necessary from the point of
view of the court’s legitimacy. One gets the sense that the
GRULAC contingent on the court has diminished in strength
against the rise of the African States on the court.

Number of Judges

Chart 1: Regional Representation on the ICC
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Unlike the ICJ and several national supreme courts, the ICC
does not regularly convene in plenary sessions to perform its
work.162 Instead, the ICC has three divisions, and each division
performs its work in chambers. The three divisions are: Ap-

162. See ICC at a Glance, INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/icc/about%20the%20court/icc%20at%20a%20glance/Pages/ic
c%20at%20a%20glance.aspx (last visited Jan. 6, 2013).
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peals, Trial, and Pre-Trial.163 The Appeals Division consists of
the president of the ICC and four other judges.164 The Trial and
Pre-Trial Divisions consist of not less than six judges each.165
ICC judges typically serve nine year non-renewable terms in
office,166 and judges assigned to the Appeals Chamber must
spend the entire length of their terms on that chamber,167 perhaps to ensure that they are insulated from being biased in favor of judges whose decisions they are considering on appeal.
Judges in the other divisions are required to serve in that division for a three year term,168 which suggests that they possibly
rotate between divisions. The Rome Statute mandates diversity
even in the allocation of judges to divisions. Thus, each division
is required to have an “appropriate combination” of expertise in
criminal law and procedure and in international law.169 Further, the Trial and Pre-Trial divisions are to be composed primarily of judges with criminal experience.170
There are five regional subgroups on the ICC, but not all
have been equally represented on the Appeals Chamber. Judge
Song (Asian States) and Judge Kourula (WEOG) have served
on the Appeals Chamber since the inception of the ICC.171
Nearly 80 percent of the decisions of the Appeals Chamber
were issued by either Judge Kirsch (WEOG), Judge Pillay (African States), and Judge Pikis (Asian States), or by Judge
Ušacka (Eastern Europe), Judge Nsereko (African States), and
Judge Kuenychia (African States), along with Judges Song and
Kourula. Thus, a GRULAC state has never had a judge on the
Appeals Chamber. Between 2006 and 2008, cases were decided
by an Appeals Chamber that had two judges each from the
Asian States and WEOG, and only one judge from the African
States. However, more recently, the balance has tipped in favor
163. See
Chambers,
INT’L
CRIM.
CT.,
http://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/chambers/Pages/chamb
ers.aspx (last visited Jan. 6, 2013).
164. Rome Statute, supra note 153, art. 39(1).
165. Id.
166. Id. art. 36(9)(a). However, a judge assigned to a Trial or Appeals
Chamber must stay on until a trial or appeal is concluded. Id. art. 36(10).
167. Id. art. 39(3)(b).
168. Id. art. 39(3)(a).
169. Id. art. 39(1).
170. Id.
171. Both judges served on the court initially from 2003–2006, and their
terms were later renewed until 2015.
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of the African States, and cases decided by the Appeals Chamber from 2009 onwards typically had two judges from the African States and one each from WEOG, the Asian States, and
Eastern Europe. Accordingly, the heavy presence of Africa on
the docket of the ICC has ensured that the African judges on
the Appeals Chamber of the ICC outnumber judges from each
individual sub-region on that chamber.
Interestingly, although the ICC has a majority of judges with
criminal law experience serving on it, the Appeals Chamber
typically has a majority of judges with generalist international
law experience. At an appellate level, it is perhaps thought fit
to have judges think of the law on generalist terms at a normative level, instead of at a technical criminal law level. Further,
although the ICC has had a majority of female judges serving
on it since 2009, the Appeals Chamber has typically always
featured a majority of male judges. In terms of diversity of
gender and professional experience, the Appeals Chamber of
the ICC therefore stands in contrast to the general body of the
ICC.
III. DOES DIVERSITY IMPACT DECISION MAKING ON THE ICC?
I decided to quantitatively test whether diversity makes any
difference to the manner in which cases are decided on the Appeals Chamber of the ICC. Although only one case has been
concluded by the ICC so far,172 and the vast majority of its “decisions” are housekeeping matters (e.g., directions for the prosecution and defense to file replies within stipulated periods of
time, orders scheduling hearings and appointing presiding officers, etc.), the Appeals Chamber of the ICC has issued a sizeable number of decisions in cases involving adversarial contests. I decided to test whether the presence of a higher number
of African judges on the Appeals Chamber of the ICC made the
court more or less likely to hold in favor of African defendants.
So far, the ICC has dealt exclusively with cases arising out of
Africa, and appointments made to the ICC in recent times have

172. See Press Release, International Criminal Court, ICC First Verdict:
Thomas Lubanga Guilty of Conscripting and Enlisting Children Under the
Age of 15 and Using Them to Participate in Hostilities (Mar. 14, 2012),
http://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situ
ation%20icc%200104/related%20cases/icc%200104%200106/press%20releases
/Pages/pr776.aspx.
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reflected a shift towards appointing more judges from the African States. My research question was: does a higher number of
African judges on the court make the court more or less defendant friendly, given that all the defendants are of African
origin?
As discussed above, before 2009, the Appeals Chamber of the
ICC had only one judge from the African States serving on it.
Judges Song, Kirsch, Pikis, Pillay, and Kourula decided the
vast majority of cases in the pre-2009 Appeals Chamber. Only
Judge Pillay belonged to the African States. However, starting
in 2009, the Appeals Chamber had two judges from the African
States serving on it. Judges Kuenychia, Kourula, Ušacka,
Nsereko, and Song decided the vast majority of cases in the
post-2009 Appeals Chamber, which included Judges Kuenychia
and Nsereko of the African States. The post-2009 Appeals
Chamber also had an Eastern Europe judge serving on it
(Ušacka). The question was, controlling for other variables, did
the pre- and post-2009 Appeals Chambers of the ICC adopt different attitudes towards defendants?
I systematically analyzed decisions173 of the Appeals Chamber of the ICC between 2006 and 2012.174 Each decision was
173. Including orders and judgments.
174. I did not count any of the following types of decisions of the Appeals
Chamber: orders appointing a presiding judge, setting time limits, directing
the prosecution or defense to respond to an application for extension of time
or page limits, scheduling orders, requests for views of parties, or decisions
where the arguments of the prosecution and defense were aligned (e.g., where
both took the same position towards an attempted amici intervention or victim participation, etc.), where the contest was not one between the prosecution and defense (e.g., where the prosecution and registrar of the court were
in contest), or where the Appeals Chamber did not conclusively find in favor
of either prosecution or defense over the other (e.g., where the Appeals
Chamber found merit in the cross appeals of both the prosecution and defense and reversed the Trial Chamber’s decision). The following types of cases
were counted: grants of applications for extension of time, rejections of documents as being inadmissible, ex parte orders seeking to know from the prosecution why certain documents should continue to remain confidential, and of
course, confirmations or reversals of appeals. If a trial chamber’s decision was
partly reversed and partly affirmed, then the Appeals Chamber was counted
as having decided in favor of the prosecution if more of the prosecution’s contentions were accepted rather than denied, and vice versa. A conscious attempt was made to code cases by outcome. Thus, where the Appeals Chamber
found that the prosecution’s request for an extension of page limits was superfluous, because the prosecution erroneously believed the page limit to be
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coded based on its outcome and assigned a value of 1 if the decision went in favor of the defendant and 0 if the decision went
against the defendant or in favor of the prosecution. The independent variable was whether the case was decided by the pre2009 or post-2009 Appeals Chamber of the ICC—the decision
was assigned a value of 1 if it was decided by the post-2009
Appeals Chamber of the ICC and 0 if it was decided by the pre2009 Appeals Chamber of the ICC. I controlled for the type of
case with which the Appeals Chamber was dealing based on
the identity of the defendant. Thus, for example, if the defendant in the decision was Joseph Kony,175 the decision was assigned a value of 1, if not, a value of 0, and this process was repeated for each defendant variable. The results of the logistic
regression analysis are set out below.
The upshot is that the post-2009 Appeals Chamber—the one
with two African judges—held against the defendant at a statistically significant level176 when compared to the pre-2009
Appeals Chamber of the ICC. This is suggestive of the hypothesis that the geographic and national background of judges does,
in fact, make a difference to the manner in which cases are decided. The regression analysis I have conducted suggests that
the presence of more African judges on the Appeals Chamber
may have made it more likely for the Appeals Chamber to decide cases against the defendants, all of whom were African.
Perhaps African judges, who are more closely aware of the
atrocities alleged to have been committed by the defendants,
are less likely to decide cases in favor of African defendants.
Their presence in a larger number on the Appeals Chamber of

twenty pages (whereas it was 100 pages), the case was counted as a proprosecution case, since the prosecution achieved its desired result/interpretation in outcome.
175. The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and
Dominic Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest (July 8,
2005),
http://www2.icccpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations/Situation+ICC+0204/Rel
ated+Cases/ICC+0204+0105/Court+Records/Chambers/Pre+Trial+Chamber+
II/Warrant+of+Arrest+for+Joseph+Kony+issued+on+8th+July+2005+as+ame
nded+on+27th+September+2005.htm. Kony stands accused of crimes against
humanity, enslavement of children, etc. See generally KATHY COOK, STOLEN
ANGELS: THE KIDNAPPED GIRLS OF UGANDA (2007).
176. The p value is 0.0412.
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the ICC might have had a “panel effect”177 on the working of
the chamber.
Dependent Variable: OUTCOME
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing)
Date: 03/07/12 Time: 13:50
Sample: 1 76
Included observations: 76
Convergence achieved after 4 iterations
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

z-Statistic

Prob.

BENCH
MBARUSHIMANA
MUTHAURA
KATANGA
GOMBO
KONY
JAMUS
DYILO

-2.617438
2.617438
1.231144
-0.223144
2.165453
1.750666
2.617438
-0.470004

1.281890
1.625805
1.700953
0.670820
1.370039
1.192555
1.908728
0.403113

-2.041859
1.609934
0.723796
-0.332643
1.580577
1.467997
1.371300
-1.165936

0.0412
0.1074
0.4692
0.7394
0.1140
0.1421
0.1703
0.2436

Mean dependent var
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
Deviance
Avg. log likelihood

0.394737
0.486710
16.10828
-46.57764
93.15528
-0.612864

S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Restr. deviance

0.492042
1.436254
1.681594
1.534304
101.9646

Obs with Dep=0
Obs with Dep=1

46
30

Total obs

76

However, it is important to underscore that the evidence presented above is only suggestive and not conclusive of the hypothesis that geographic background impacts decision making.
Although both the pre- and post-2009 Appeals Chambers had
the same number of List A and List B judges (i.e., the same
number of judges who were criminal law specialists and international law generalists), the post-2009 Appeals Chamber had
177. CASS SUNSTEIN

ET AL.,

OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY

ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
7 (2006).
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two female judges on it as opposed to the pre-2009 Appeals
Chamber which had only one female judge. It is possible that
the presence of a higher number of female judges would make
the Appeals Chamber more likely to decide cases against defendants (all of whom were male), particularly when many victims of the crimes were women—but the evidence presented in
the coming paragraphs tends to negate this theory. It is possible that the presence of the Eastern Europe judge on the post2009 Appeals Chamber had an impact on the court’s likelihood
to decide cases against the defendant—but the evidence presented in the coming paragraphs tends to negate this hypothesis as well. The evidence does not rule out the possibility that
the Appeals Chamber might have become less defendantfriendly over time. However, the evidence suggests that geographic factors, namely the presence of an additional judge
from the African States, could possibly explain the Appeals
Chamber’s statistically significant unfriendly attitude towards
defendants after 2009.
Judges dissented in approximately 30 percent of the coded
decisions of the Appeals Chamber of the ICC—decisions that
were genuine contests and not housekeeping matters. More decisions generated dissent in the pre-2009 Appeals Chamber
than in the post-2009 Appeals Chamber, and the difference in
the proportion of dissents recorded in the pre- and post-2009
Appeals Chambers was statistically significant.178 Further,
there was a statistically significant (at the 90 percent confidence interval) negative relationship between the outcome of
the decision (i.e., whether it was pro- or anti-defendant) and
whether a dissent would be recorded in the decision—in other
words, there was a higher likelihood of a dissent being recorded
if the majority decision went in favor of prosecution than if it
went in favor of the defense. The results of the logistic regression are reported below. The data suggest that dissenters were
typically pro-defendant, and given that a statistically significant higher proportion of dissents were recorded in the pre2009 Appeals Chamber, this is more evidence that the pre-2009
Appeals Chamber was less anti-defendant than the post-2009
Appeals Chamber.

178. P value: 0.0131.
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The dissenting judges were almost overwhelmingly from the
Asian States. Judges Pikis and Song were the key dissenters on
the Appeals Chamber. Chart 2 breaks the dissents on the court
down by region and Chart 3 breaks the figures down by the individual dissenting judge. Importantly, judges from the African
States recorded the lowest level of dissent on the Appeals
Chamber of the ICC. Since the data above reveal that dissenters tended to be pro-defendant, the fact that judges from the
African States recorded the lowest level of dissent adds weight
to the hypothesis that they were more anti-defendant than other judges on the Appeals Chamber. After the Asian States
judges, the highest number of dissenting votes during this period were recorded by a female judge—Anita Ušacka—also the
only Eastern Europe judge on the Appeals Chamber between
2009 and 2012 for the cases coded. Although Judge Ušacka registered only three dissenting votes during this period, in two of
those three cases the majority of the Appeals Chamber decided
the case against the defendant. Again, this tends to suggest
that the presence of more female judges on the post-2009 Appeals Chamber, and the presence of the Eastern Europe judge
in that Chamber, may not have been the influences driving the
shift in the Appeals Chamber’s attitude towards defendants
starting in 2009.
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Chart 2: Dissents by Region on the Appeals Chamber, ICC
30

Number

25
20
Dissenting Votes

15
10
5
0
Asian States

WEOG

African States

Eastern Europe

Regional Group

20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
O
za
ki

se
re
ko
U
sa
ck
Tr
a
en
da
fil
ov
a
Ku
en
yc
hi
a
Al
uc
oc
h
M
on
ag
en
g
W
yn
ga
er
t

Pi
kis

N

Ko
ur
u

la

Dissenting
Votes

Ki
rs
ch

So
ng

Number

Chart 3: Dissents by Judge on the Appeals Chamber, ICC

Judge

CONCLUSION
Much of the scholarly literature surveyed in this Article argues that diversity enhances a court’s legitimacy by making it
seem more inclusive. However, this Article presents evidence to
suggest that the legitimacy of international courts might be
undermined by a justifiable fear that judges from particular
geographic regions—regions that dominate judgeships on international courts—might harbor conscious or subconscious
biases towards or against certain causes. The results of this
study are suggestive, but not conclusive. The quantitative
analysis relies on only seventy-six observations, and a more
definitive answer to my research question cannot be provided
until a substantially larger number of decisions are issued by
the ICC. However, the analysis in this Article suggests that the
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geographic background of a judge has the capacity to impact
the manner in which he or she decides cases. What this means
for the international system is that the criterion of “fair” geographic representation in appointing judges to international
courts must be carefully assessed. The presence of a higher
number of judges from the African States might bolster the legitimacy of the ICC—the court may consequently be seen as a
truly inclusive judicial body, and not merely as an institution
where “outsiders” pass judgment on Africans. At the same
time, however, the presence of a higher number of judges from
the African States on the ICC has the potential to undermine
the very legitimacy of the court that its inclusiveness seeks to
engender. By virtue of their backgrounds, judges may appear to
be biased against the African defendants whose alleged crimes
they know so well. Allegations of bias can be as damaging to a
court’s legitimacy as accusations of under-inclusiveness.
This Article does not canvas an argument that diversity on
international or national courts is illegitimate or inadvisable.
There are tensions between diversity and impartiality on
courts, but these tensions can be appropriately addressed by
staffing judgeships fairly amongst diverse constituencies or
groups. The problem with the norm of geographic representation on international courts is that it is rarely ever truly or
honestly inclusive. Judges of P5 countries dominate judgeships
on international bodies, as do judges of regions that have a
stake in the stability and security of the region with which the
court deals. The Appeals Chamber of the ICC has five judges
serving on it and representation on the Chamber can consequently be given to each of the five regional subgroups—but
this has not happened. A judge each from France and the United Kingdom has always served on the ICC, and judges from the
African States have increasingly been appointed to the court.
This undermines the perception that the ICC, or any other international court, is a neutral adjudicator of disputes, one
which dispassionately applies international law to specific factual situations in a political vacuum. Instead, the court opens
itself up to accusations of bias which may undermine its credibility and unseat the very legitimacy that a system of diversity
seeks to create. In order to be perceived as legitimate, the norm
of geographic diversity on international courts must embrace
true diversity—not just diversity fostered by geopolitical realities.
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APPENDIX: JUDGES OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
(2003–12)

Judge
Philippe
KIRSCHE
Akua
KUENYEHIA
René
BLATTMANN
Karl T.
HUDSONPHILLIPS
Claude JORDA
Georghios M.
PIKIS
Elizabeth ODIO
BENITO
Navanethem
PILLAY
Sang-Hyun
SONG
Hans-Peter
KAUL
Mauro POLITI
Maureen Harding
CLARK
Erkki KOURULA
Fatoumata Dembele DIARRA
Anita UŠACKA

A
/
B
B

Term

Renew

Other
Term
Expir.
Cause

Group
WEOG

Country
Canada

Gender
M

2003-09

Ghana

F

2003-06

B

African
States
GRULAC

Bolivia

M

2003-09

A

GRULAC

Trinidad
& Tobago

M

2003-12

Resig.

A
A

WEOG
Asian
States
GRULAC

France
Cyprus

M
M

2003-09
2003-09

Resig.

F

2003-12

F

2003-09

M

2003-06

2006-15

B

African
States
Asian
States
WEOG

Costa
Rica
South
Africa
Korea
Germany

M

2003-06

2006-15

B
A

WEOG
WEOG

Italy

M

2003-09

Ireland

F

2003-12

B
A

WEOG
African
States
Eastern
Europe

Finland
Mali

M
F

2003-06
2003-12

2006-15

Latvia

F

2003-06

2006-15

B

A
B
A

B

Sir Adrian
FULFORD
Sylvia STEINER

A

WEOG

UK

M

2003-12

A

GRULAC

Brazil

F

2003-12

Tuiloma Neroni
SLADE

A

Asian
States

Samoa

M

2003-06

2006-15

Resig.
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Ekaterina
TRENDAFILOVA
Daniel David
Ntanda
NSEREKO
Fumiko SAIGA

A

Eastern
Europe
African
States

Bulgaria

F

2006-15

Uganda

M

2007-12

B

Asian
States
WEOG
African
States
African
States

Japan

F

2007-09

Bruno COTTE
Joyce ALUOCH

A
A

France
Kenya

F

2008-12
2009-18

Sanji Mmasenono
MONAGENG

B

Botswana

F

2009-18

Mohamed
SHAHABUDDEE
N
Cuno
TARFUSSER

B

GRULAC

Guyana

M

2009-18

A

WEOG

Italy

M

2009-18

Christine VAN
DEN
WYNGAERT
FERNÁNDEZ DE
GURMENDI

A

WEOG

Belgium

F

2009-18

A

GRULAC

Argentina

F

2010-18

Kuniko OZAKI

B

Japan

F

2010-18

Miriam
DEFENSORSANTIAGO
Anthony Thomas
Aquinas
CARMONA
Robert FREMR

B

Asian
States
Asian
States

Philippines

F

2012-21

A

GRULAC

Trinidad
& Tobago

M

2012-21

A

Eastern
Europe

Czech
Republic

M

2012-21

Olga Venecia
HERRERA
CARBUCCIA
Howard
MORRISON

A

GRULAC

F

2012-21

A

WEOG

Dominican Republic
UK

M

2012-21

Chile EBOEOSUJI

A

African
States

Nigeria

M

2012-21

A
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2009-18

Death

Resig.

Source: These data have been complied by the author, using information posted on the website of the ICC.

